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Chris Abel’s The Extended Self is a wide-ranging study that is clearly the result of 
extensive research across many disciplines over the course of many years. The 
defining feature of the text is its breadth. Abel attempts to bring together a diz-
zying number of heretofore disparate literatures in order to supplant “popular 
concepts of the self and free will as autonomous realms of being” with “a new 
theory of the ‘extended self’ as a complex and diffuse product of that coevolu-
tion, comprising both social and material elements, including built habitations 
and artifacts in general” (1). The resultant conception of the extended self al-
lows Abel to articulate and navigate a tension at the heart of the present condi-
tion: “the same technological extensions that made Homo sapiens so successful 
now threaten the future of the race” (271).
The Extended Self is comprised of four parts and offers extensive endnotes 
spanning numerous academic and popular sources. The text also contains a 
number of illustrative images and figures, as well as helpful signposts at the 
end of each of the four parts. While Abel’s opening lines are not cheerful—he 
begins: “little progress has been made in reducing the world’s dependency on 
fossil fuels and averting catastrophic climate change” (1)—he does promise “a 
fresh look at the root causes of that dependency and their joint origins from the 
perspective of embodied minds and extended cognition” (ibid).
Part I explores the many inputs into the construction of human identity. 
Abel sets the tone for the rest of the book with a broad cross-cultural and cross-
disciplinary analysis ranging from comparisons of architectural styles in Ameri-
can suburbia and Aboriginal Australia, to reflections on social neuroscience and 
embodied phenomenology. The central claim here is that identity is tied not 
just to the most intimate and immediate sense of self we have—our bodies—but 
also to our environment, broadly construed to include both its ‘natural’ and 
‘built’ dimensions. Hence framing the project in terms of embodied minds and 
extended cognition, respectively.
With Abel’s framework in place, Part II focuses on the most obvious way 
in which we extend ourselves: by using tools, artifacts, technology or, in a 
word, technics. The guiding concern here is the way in which technology 
can take on a developmental and evolutionary trajectory of its own, beyond 
its mere instrumentality. This is what Bernard Stiegler—on whom Abel leans 
heavily—calls the problem of “runaway technics” (72). Abel runs through 
many debates in contemporary cultural evolutionary theory—the gene/meme 
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analogy, the mechanisms of cultural transmission, the operative notion of 
replication, etc.—to show how much of this theorizing is unable to give a satis-
factory account of biological and technological coevolution. Here again, Abel’s 
analysis is sweeping, and ranges from Dawkins’s Extended Phenotype, Varela and 
Maturana’s autopoetic systems, De Landa and Durham’s interactionism, to the 
spandrel debates invoked by Gould and Lewontin, Dennett, Fodor and Piattelli-
Palmarini, among others. Abel’s facility with architectural history and theory 
makes for a rather humorous dissolution of this “debate” in a way that is worth 
the price of admission.
Where the first two parts of the book set up the problems of adequately 
theorizing the extended self, the last two set out to solve these problems. Per-
haps the most significant contribution comes in Part III with Abel’s original 
formulation of the technical meme and its conjunction with the notion of an 
assemblage. The former is defined as follows:
the human mind itself is a coevolutionary product of biology and technics, 
it follows that there are no memes that are not technical memes, that is to 
say, there are no memes that are not exteriorized in some way. Viewed in this 
light, all buildings and other artifacts are embodied technical memes of kind or 
another. (156, emphasis in original)
Abel’s technical meme concept fills in some of the gaps identified in Part II, but 
cannot explain interactions among memes on its own. This is where, for Abel, 
the notion of assemblages is helpful. Though surely a fraught concept, Abel at-
tempts to cash it out with an analysis of the spoked wheel, the automobile, and 
the freeway. In this context, Abel also adds a thought-provoking observation 
(with images, to boot) about how garages for private automobiles have largely 
replaced the (semi)public space of front porches in suburban architecture. This 
sort of analysis is a strength of the text, driving home the message that humans 
are not passive recipients of environmental influences, and that design is nei-
ther impotent nor value-free.
Part IV reiterates that technical memes and their assemblages are the “cardi-
nal agents of cognitive extension and embodiment” (173) and raises what is per-
haps the most important implications of the work: “once specific assemblages 
of technical memes are culturally entrenched, despite the potential or need for 
change, individuals and groups are often reluctant to give them up, so inter-
woven are their identities with those same assemblages” (219). By Abel’s lights 
this is why, returning to the book’s opening lines, the environmental crisis is so 
intractable.
In the end, it’s hard to know if the breadth of The Extended Self is a virtue or 
a vice. Readers versed in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology 
can surely find a trove of new resources and references in Abel’s engagement 
with theorists in design, architecture, and the philosophy of technology—and 
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I suspect the reverse would be true as well. However, Abel’s writing is at times 
superficial and overly exegetical. In engaging with various empirical literatures, 
Abel too often relies on summaries of other philosophers’ summaries of em-
pirical work—a scholarly practice bound to create more confusion than clarity. 
Relatedly, it is sometimes unclear who the intended audience is, and so it can 
seem like debates about free will, consciousness, dualism, personal identity, etc. 
are being unnecessarily and unhelpfully run together.
Perhaps the biggest worry in this regard is the unacknowledged tension in 
the way the book is framed: embodied minds and extended cognition. Andy 
Clark, whom Abel cites approvingly, has pointed out that his own brand of the 
extended mind is perhaps incompatible with strong theories of embodiment.1 
In a sentence, one can’t be committed to both (1) the thesis that anything ful-
filling the appropriate functional role can constitute mental states or processes 
and (2) the thesis that idiosyncrasies of human embodiment make ineliminable 
contributions to mental states and processes. This is not to say that such a tension 
necessarily undermines the whole project, but it is rather one of many instances 
where a more careful and circumscribed approach could help to clarify the argu-
ments on offer.
Despite these issues, I think what the book lacks in depth and precision, it 
ultimately makes up for in breadth and originality. Abel’s text should thus be 
of interest to theorists of many stripes, especially those who lean anti-individ-
ualist, externalist, or interactionist. It would be hard to imagine reading The 
Extended Self and not coming away with new directions for future research.2
1. See Andy Clark’s “Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Em-
bedded Mind” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008): 37–59. And for a re-
sponse, see Dempsey and Shani’s “Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied 
Cognition” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2013): 590–617.
2. Thanks to Billy Dean Goehring and Nicolae Morar for helpful conversations in writ-
ing this review.
